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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
1. Nature of the case 
 
This is a personal injury action for stroke injuries sustained when Plaintiff Carol English 
underwent a medical procedure performed by Defendants James Taylor, D.O., and Eastern Idaho 
Health Services, Inc., dba Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (the Medical Defendants).  In 
performing the procedure, the Medical Defendants used a medical device designed, 
manufactured and sold by Defendants Cook Incorporated, Cook Medical Incorporated, and/or 
Cook Medical Technologies, LLC (the Cook Defendants).  The question of liability turns on 
whether and to what extent the Cook Defendants’ device was defective, and whether and to what 
extent the Medical Defendants negligently performed the procedure.   
This appeal arises out of the trial court’s dismissal of the Englishes’ causes of action 
against the Medical Defendants on timeliness grounds.1 
2. Course of proceedings below 
 
The trial court granted the Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, 
dismissing the Englishes’ medical negligence claims based upon the trial court’s determination 
that Idaho Supreme Court precedent required the Englishes to serve a copy of their motion to 
amend the complaint on the Medical Defendants in order to commence the Englishes’ claims 
1 This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the Englishes’ medical negligence causes of 
action only.  The Englishes’ claims against the Cook Defendants were not dismissed, and the 
Cook Defendants are therefore not parties to this appeal.  The district court certified its dismissal 
orders as final, and the district court action against the Cook Defendants has been stayed pending 
this appeal. 
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against the Medical Defendants.  The trial court then denied the Englishes’ motion for 
reconsideration, which was based upon a ruling by the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho that the Englishes’ Second Amended Complaint was timely filed as of 
December 10, 2013, the date on which their motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed.  
The trial court certified its judgments of dismissal as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).2  
3. Statement of facts 
 
On September 17, 2011, Carol English went to the hospital with a nose bleed.  After 
attempting other treatments to stop the nose bleed, the Medical Defendants attempted an 
epistaxis embolization procedure on Mrs. English, a procedure wherein PVA foam embolization 
particles are injected into the area of a nose bleed to create an embolus and stop the nose bleed.  
To accomplish this injection, the Medical Defendant used a device called the Cantata 
Superselective Microcatheter, which was designed, manufactured and sold by the Cook 
Defendants.  While in the course of injecting the particles into Mrs. English’s left internal 
maxillary artery, the catheter unexpectedly released all of the PVA particles into Mrs. English’s 
arteries.  The particles clotted and caused a stroke, resulting in permanent and disabling injuries.3 
The cause of the release of all the PVA particles is at the heart of the liability question.  
The Medical Defendants recorded in their patient chart and contend in this case that the 
Microcatheter was defective by reason of a linear tear in the catheter, observed by 
2 R Vol. 2, p. 336 (Order Granting Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgments of 
Dismissal of Medical Defendant and Rule 54(b) Certification). 
3 R Vol. 1, pp. 10-11 (Complaint and Jury Demand, ¶¶ 1-6). 
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Defendant/Appellee Dr. James Taylor after the procedure, which caused the release of all the 
embolization particles.  However, the Medical Defendants inadvertently disposed of the 
Microcatheter at issue after the procedure was completed.4   Without having access to the 
Microcatheter for evaluation and analysis, the Englishes anticipated that the Cook Defendants 
would seek to avoid liability by placing blame on the Medical Defendants, contending that 
medical negligence in performing the procedure, not a defective product, caused Mrs. English’s 
injuries and Plaintiffs’ damages.   
Believing this to be more likely a products liability case than a medical negligence case, 
the Englishes’ counsel communicated at length with counsel for the Medical Defendants 
concerning the Englishes’ claims, including the bases of possible medical negligence claims 
against the Medical Defendants, and proposed tolling agreements and cooperative investigation 
into the facts.5  When the Medical Defendants declined these overtures, the Englishes concluded 
that they needed to pursue both products liability claims against the Cook Defendants and 
medical negligence claims against the Medical Defendants. 
The Englishes’ products liability claims and medical negligence claims were subject to 
different procedural rules, which is where the problems giving rise to this appeal began.  
Pursuant to the Idaho medical malpractice statutes,6 in order for an injured patient to pursue a 
lawsuit against a medical provider, he or she must satisfy statutory prelitigation requirements, 
4 R Vol. 1, p. 89 (Affidavit of Ralph L. Dewsnup, ¶ 3). 
5 R Vol. 1, pp. 89-90 (Affidavit of Ralph L. Dewsnup, ¶¶ 4-6). 
6 IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 et seq.  
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which include submission of a written statement of the bases of the medical negligence claim, a 
hearing in which the plaintiff presents his or her claims and the defendant responds to those 
claims before a panel convened by the Idaho Board of Medicine for that specific purpose, and a 
written opinion concerning the merits of the claims from the panel.7  The initiation of this 
prelitigation procedure tolls the statute of limitations until 30 days after the prelitigation panel 
files its written opinion.8 
The Englishes filed suit against the Cook Defendants in the Idaho Seventh Judicial 
District Court on September 16, 2013,9 the last day before the statute of limitations ran.  They 
concurrently filed with the Idaho Board of Medicine and served upon the Medical Defendants a 
written statement of their claims against the Medical Defendants, setting forth the circumstances 
of the alleged malpractice and its consequences,10 just as they had done during the preceding 
months in discussions with counsel for the Medical Defendants.  Pursuant to statute, the Board of 
Medicine then appointed a panel, which held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ claims.  The Medical 
Defendants had an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ claims during the hearing.11  On 
November 18, 2013, the panel filed a written opinion with the Board of Medicine concerning the 
7 Id. at § 6-1001 (setting forth the prelitigation hearing procedure, which is “compulsory as a 
condition precedent to litigation”). 
8 Id. at § 6-1006; James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 727 P.2d 1136, 1139-41 (1986). 
9 R Vol. 1, pp. 9-15 (Complaint and Jury Demand).  The First Amended Complaint, making only 
formalistic and not substantive changes, was then filed September 18, 2013.  R Vol. 1, pp. 16-23. 
10 IDAHO CODE § 6-1007. 
11 Id. at §§ 6-1001, 6-1002. 
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substance of the claims.12  The 30-day statutory tolling period ended on December 18, 2013, and 
the limitations period expired on December 19, 2013. 
While the Medical Defendants were proceeding through the prelitigation process, the 
Cook Defendants had removed the case pending in the Idaho Seventh Judicial District Court to 
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.13  Although the Englishes had complied with 
the statutory prelitigation requirements, they were required to obtain leave of court in order to 
amend their complaint to name the Medical Defendants, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Accordingly, the Englishes moved to amend their complaint on December 
10, 2013, within the limitations period, filing their proposed Second Amended Complaint with 
the motion, which asserted the same claims that the Medical Defendants had discussed with the 
Englishes’ counsel in the preceding months, and to which the Medical Defendants had just 
responded in the prelitigation hearing.14  The Cook Defendants, as parties to the lawsuit, were 
served with the Motion to Amend and the Amended Complaint.  As the Medical Defendants 
were not parties to the lawsuit yet, they were not served with a copy of the motion for leave to 
amend.15   
12 R. Vol. 1, p. 47 (affidavit of Marvin M. Smith, ¶ 3). 
13 R Vol. 1, pp. 95-100 (Notice of Removal). 
14 R Vol. 1, pp. 102-17 (Plaintiffs’ Motion and Supporting Memorandum for Leave to File 
Second Amended Complaint, as well as the Second Amended Complaint filed therewith). 
15 As counsel for the Hospital has acknowledged, “[a]t the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion for 
Leave to file Second Amended Complaint [the Medical Defendants were] not part[ies] to the 
lawsuit.”  R Vol. 1, p. 56 (Memorandum in Support of EIRMC’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 2). 
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The effect of the filing of the motion for leave to amend is the central issue in this appeal.  
Idaho Supreme Court precedent provides that the filing of a motion for leave to amend with the 
proposed amended complaint commences a cause of action seeking to add new parties, where, as 
here, the new parties have knowledge of the substance of the claims against them.  The 
Englishes, therefore, timely filed their motion for leave to amend and the amended complaint, 
knowing that if any defendant knew the substance of the claims against them, the Medical 
Defendants did, having not only engaged in discussions with the Englishes’ counsel specific to 
the substance of potential medical negligence claims against them for many months, but also 
having been through the statutory prelitigation process that required the Medical Defendants’ 
knowledge of and response to the substance of the very claims contained in the amended 
complaint, and even a written panel opinion concerning the substance of those claims. 
The federal district court ultimately granted the Englishes’ Motion to Amend on January 
16, 2014,16 and the Englishes formally filed their Second Amended Complaint in federal court 
that same day.  As diversity was lost, the case was then remanded to state court.17  The Medical 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the Englishes’ claims against them 
were untimely because they were formally filed on January 16, 2014, after the limitations period 
expired on December 19, 2013.   
16 R Vol. 1, p. 119 (Docket entry order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Complaint). 
17 R Vol. 1, p. 121 (Order to Remand). 
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Puzzled at this challenge, given the clarity of the law, the Englishes requested 
clarification from the federal district court concerning its ruling granting the Englishes’ motion 
for leave to amend relative to its effect on the commencement of their claims against the Medical 
Defendants.  The federal district court clarified its ruling, stating:  “Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 
Complaint was effectively filed on December 10, 2013, the date it was filed with Plaintiffs’ 
Unopposed Motion to Amend.”18 
Notwithstanding the clarity of Idaho law, the district court granted the Medical 
Defendants’ summary judgment motions.  When asked to reconsider in light of the federal 
court’s clarification, the district court reiterated its prior ruling, with no analysis of the federal 
court’s ruling or the applicable law.  The Englishes appeal from these rulings. 
 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
 
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in all actions in federal court, and in 
diversity cases, federal courts apply federal law on matters of procedure.  Rule 15 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure governed the motion to amend the complaint in this case, and the effect 
of a motion to amend under that rule is a question of procedure governed by federal law.  Where 
this case was pending in federal court at the time the motion to amend was filed, did the district 
court err in rejecting the federal court’s determination under federal law that the action against 
the Medical Defendants was deemed filed as of the date the motion to amend was filed? 
18 R Vol. 2, p. 240 (Federal court’s April 9, 2014 Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to clarify). 
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2. Under Idaho law, an action against a defendant named in an amended complaint is 
deemed filed as of the date a motion to amend the complaint to name the new defendant is filed 
if that defendant had notice of the substance of the proposed amendment within the limitations 
period.  The Medical Defendants knew the substance of the Englishes’ claims against them 
because they had discussed those claims with Plaintiffs’ counsel and had gone through a 
statutory prelitigation procedure.  Did the district court err in ruling that the Englishes’ amended 
complaint adding the Medical Defendants as defendants was untimely because the motion to 
amend was not served on them? 
3. Other jurisdictions that, like Idaho, deem actions commenced when a complaint is 
filed with the court do not require that a new defendant have notice of the substance of the 
proposed amendment before a motion to amend the complaint to name the new defendant is 
deemed to commence the action against that defendant.  Should this Court depart from that line 
of cases and require notice of a motion for leave to amend to add new parties before the action 
against the new party is deemed commenced? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
 
The Englishes do not seek attorney fees on appeal.   
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ARGUMENT 
 
1. Summary of argument 
 
This matter had been removed and was pending before the United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho at the time the Englishes moved for leave to amend their complaint 
under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The federal court properly applied 
federal procedural law and ruled that the complaint against the Medical Defendants was deemed 
filed as of the date the motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15 was filed.  That ruling should decide 
this appeal. 
Even if this case had not been governed by federal procedural law at the time the motion 
to amend was filed, Idaho law would likewise have deemed the amended complaint filed as of 
the date the Englishes filed their motion to amend.  This Court has determined that an Idaho 
action against a new defendant is deemed commenced upon the filing of a motion to amend the 
complaint to add the new defendant where the new defendant has “notice of the substance of the 
amendment” within the limitations period.  The trial court interpreted this language to mean that 
a plaintiff seeking to add a new defendant by way of a motion to amend is required to serve a 
copy of the motion to amend on the proposed new defendant (a non-party) within the limitations 
period, or else file a separate action and consolidate the two actions.  The Medical Defendants 
had abundant notice of the substance of the claims against them within the limitations period, but 
because they were not parties and were therefore not served with the motion to amend, the trial 
court deemed the Englishes’ action against the Medical Defendants untimely.  This Court’s 
pronouncement of Idaho law is clear that “notice of the substance of the amendment,” not service 
13 
 
of a motion to amend, is the determinative factor in deciding whether the motion to amend 
commences the action, and the Englishes met that requirement. 
The fact that the Medical Defendants had abundant notice of the substance of the claims 
against them within the limitations period should decide this appeal.  But if not, the Englishes 
additionally urge the Court to consider both the necessity and practicality of the notice 
requirement, where the requirement causes non-uniform treatment of civil defendants, gives rise 
to unnecessary procedural problems, is not imposed in other jurisdictions with action 
commencement rules like Idaho’s, and runs counter to Idaho’s policy favoring procedures that 
allow claims to be decided on their merits. 
2. Standard of review 
 
On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of 
review that a trial court applies in ruling on the motion.19  “All disputed facts are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.”20   
Summary judgment is only appropriate in cases where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.21  In the absence 
19 Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002). 
20 Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005) (citing Infanger, 137 Idaho 
45, 44 P.3d at 1002). 
21 IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
14 
 
                                                   
of disputed issues of material fact, where only a question of law remains, “this Court exercises 
free review.”22 
3. The question of when the amended complaint was deemed filed is a procedural 
question governed by federal procedural law, under which an amended complaint is 
deemed filed as of the date a motion to amend is filed. 
 
When the Englishes filed their motion to amend, this case was pending in federal court.  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in all civil actions in federal court.23  Of course, in 
cases such as this that are based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the federal courts apply 
state substantive law, but they apply federal law on matters of procedure.24  This is particularly 
true of matters covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the 
Court is a far cry from the typical relatively unguided Erie choice:  the court has 
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the 
Advisory Committee, this Court [i.e., the United States Supreme Court], and 
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question 
transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.25 
 
AThus, the full-blown Erie analysis--first determining whether a matter is substantive or 
procedural and then applying state law on substantive matters--does not apply if the matter in 
question is covered by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.@26 
22 Infanger, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d at 1002. 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.   
24 E.g., Hiatt v. Mazda Motor Corp., 75 F.3d 1252, 1255 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).   
25 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
26 Hiatt, 75 F.3d at 1258. 
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The United States Supreme Court made this principle clear in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.:27 “We must first determine whether [the federal rule in 
question] answers the question in dispute. If it does, it governs – [state] law notwithstanding – 
unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress‘s rulemaking power. We do not wade into 
Erie’s murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable or invalid.”28  The Court went on to 
observe:  
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant‘s substantive rights; most 
procedural rules do. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
445, 66 S.Ct. 242, 90 L.Ed.185 (1946). What matters is what the rule itself 
regulates: If it governs only “the manner and the means” by which the litigants’ 
rights are ”enforced,” it is valid; if it alters ”the rules of decision by which [the] 
court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it is not.29 
 
Here, before the Englishes could amend their complaint in federal court to add the 
Medical Defendants as parties, they had to file a motion to amend their complaint under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15.  The effect of a motion to amend under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15 is a question of procedure governed by federal law.30  Indeed, this Court has also 
27 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
28 Id. at 398 (citations omitted). 
29 Id. at 407 (citation omitted) (per Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.; Thomas, J.; and 
Sotomayor, J.) 
30 E.g., Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972) (Athe construction and 
application of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . is entirely a matter of Federal 
practice,@ governed by federal law); Meyers v. Am. States Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 904, 908-09 (D. 
S.D. 1996) (AA motion to amend is a procedural matter governed by federal law.@) (citing Hiatt, 
75 F.3d at 1258); Heiser v. Ass=n of Apt. Owners, 848 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (D. Haw. 1993) (in 
diversity cases, state law applies on questions related to statutes of limitations, but the federal 
rule will generally apply in determining whether an amendment to a complaint relates back) 
16 
 
                                                   
acknowledged that when an action is commenced is a procedural question,31 and that federal 
courts have applied “analogous rules of federal procedure” in determining the effect of filing a 
motion for leave to amend.32  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 Ais a truly procedural rule 
because it governs the in-court dispute resolution processes rather than the dispute that brought 
the parties into court; consequently it does not transgress the Rules Enabling Act,@ and Athere is 
no credible basis for impugning its constitutionality.@33  Thus, federal law governed the question 
of whether the amended federal complaint was deemed filed as of the date the motion to amend 
was filed. 
The applicable federal procedural law is clear:  Where a motion to amend a complaint 
under rule 15 is granted, the amended complaint is deemed filed as of the date the motion to 
amend was filed.34  This is the only date that the parties can control.  Were the rule otherwise, a 
plaintiff seeking to add new parties shortly before the statute of limitations is about to run as to 
(citing 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure ' 1503 (1986)); Fed. 
Leasing, Inc. v. Amperif Corp., 840 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (D. Md. 1993) (the federal rule governs 
the relation back of amendments and controls in the face of a conflicting less generous state law).   
31 See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 398, 247 P.3d 620, 625 (2010) 
(“While the legislature has the power to enact substantive laws, the Supreme Court has the 
inherent ‘power to fashion the procedures necessary to perform [its] duties.’ City of Boise v Ada 
County, 147 Idaho 794, 802, 215 P.3d 514, 522 (2009). . . .  [B]ecause the legislature is silent on 
this issue, it is this Court’s responsibility to apply a meaning of ‘commence proceedings . . . .’”). 
32 Terra-West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 398. 
33 Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Santana v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
34 E.g., Buller Trucking Co. v. Owner Operator Indep. Driver Risk Retention Grp., 461 F. Supp. 
2d 768, 776-77 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (collecting cases). 
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them would be required to file a separate action in every case rather than risk having the court 
grant the motion after the statute of limitations had run.  And, in a case like this, where there 
would be no basis for federal jurisdiction in the separate action, those two cases would 
necessarily have to proceed down parallel tracks that could never meet--one in federal court and 
one in state court. 
Here, the federal district court held that the Second Amended Complaint, adding the 
Medical Defendants as defendants, was deemed filed on December 10, 2013, within the statute 
of limitations.  That should be dispositive of this appeal. 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,35 the case the Medical Defendants principally relied on 
below, is distinguishable.  That case involved a state statute of limitations that provided that an 
action was not deemed Acommenced@ for purposes of the statute of limitations until service of the 
summons on the defendant.  The statute also provided that the action would be deemed 
commenced from the date of filing if the defendant was served within 60 days, even if the 
defendant was served outside of the limitations period.  The defendant in that case was not 
served until long after the 60-day period had run.  The Court held that the action was time-barred 
because the state statute of limitations, including its service requirement, which was “an integral 
part of the statute of limitations,”36 governed, as opposed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 
defining commencement of an action.   
35 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
36 Id. at 748. 
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This is not a case, like Walker, where a state statute that was “an integral part of the state 
statute of limitations@37 would completely bar recovery if the suit were brought in state court.  
The state statute of limitations in this case is two years.  But the state statute of limitations does 
not say what the effect of moving to amend a complaint is, especially a federal complaint in 
federal court.  That is a question of federal procedural law, governed by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and their interpretation.  The Court in Walker recognized that, Ain diversity 
actions Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules 
begin to run, but does not affect state statute of limitations.@38  Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15 does not affect the Idaho statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions but 
merely governs the date from which an amended complaint is deemed filed.  The choice between 
the effect of a state rule on amended pleadings and the federal rule Awould be of scant, if any, 
relevance to the choice of a forum,@ favoring application of state over federal law.39  This court 
should therefore apply federal courts= interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 
(including the conclusion of the federal district court in this case) and hold that the Plaintiffs= 
amended complaint adding the Medical Defendants was filed as of December 10, 2013, the date 
the motion to amend was filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which was before the 
Idaho statute of limitations for an action against the Medical Defendants expired. 
37 Id. at 752. 
 
38 Id. at 751 (footnote and citation omitted). 
39 Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 & n.10 (1965).  
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4. The Englishes’ amended complaint was timely because the Englishes satisfied the 
notice requirements under Idaho law. 
 
The central question presented in this appeal is whether the filing of the motion for leave 
to file an amended complaint in the federal district court with a copy of the proposed amended 
complaint on December 10, 2013, commenced the Englishes’ claims against the Medical 
Defendants.   
If Idaho law governs that question, the relevant authority is Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho 
Mut. Trust, LLC,40 a 2010 Idaho Supreme Court decision wherein the Court was presented with 
the question whether a motion for leave to amend commences an action in cases not involving 
proposed new parties.  The Court concluded without difficulty that “the filing of the motion to 
amend the complaint commenced proceedings.”41  In coming to that decision, this Court cited 
with approval “relevant state and federal case law on the issue,” as collected in Corpus Juris 
Secundum: 
[W]hen a motion to amend a complaint and a proposed amended complaint are 
filed prior to the running of the statute of limitations, the motion to amend stands 
in place of the actual amended complaint while the motion is under review by the 
trial court, and the fact that an order granting the motion to amend is entered after 
expiration of the statute of limitations does not make the amended complaint 
untimely.42 
 
40 150 Idaho 393, 247 P.3d 620 (2010). 
41 150 Idaho at 396, 247 P.3d at 623. 
42 54 C.J.S. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 329, quoted in Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 396, 247 P.3d at 
623.   
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The Court acknowledged the sound policy considerations found in federal and state Rule 
343 jurisprudence concerning this “settled rule:”44  “[I]n the context of an amended complaint, 
the plaintiff only has unilateral control over the timing of the filing of the motion for leave to 
amend, but does not have unilateral control over when the motion may be granted.”45 
If the [time limitations] cannot be satisfied until the later filing of the amended 
complaint after the motion to amend has been allowed, the [limitation] period will 
effectively be shortened by some unpredictable amount of time, as a plaintiff 
would have to file the motion to amend some considerable period in advance of 
the expiration of the [limitation] period and simply hope that the court’s ruling 
would be sufficiently prompt. It is only the first step, the filing of the motion, that 
the plaintiff can control.  Thus, the filing of the motion is comparable to the 
original filing of the complaint, both in the sense that each is the first step that a 
plaintiff takes and the first document that a plaintiff files with the court 
concerning the action, and in the sense that both the filing of the original 
complaint and the filing of the motion to amend are steps that remain unilaterally 
in the plaintiff’s control.46 
 
The party opposing the application of this rule in Terra-West posited an alternative rule, 
proposing that a plaintiff seeking to amend the complaint be required to file a separate action and 
then consolidate it with the prior action in order to satisfy the timeliness requirements.47  The 
Court observed that this approach “is contrary to the principles of judicial economy and 
43 IDAHO R. CIV. P. 3(a) (“Commencement of Action.  A civil action is commenced by the filing 
of a complaint, petition or application with the court”); FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (“A civil action is 
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”). 
44 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 396, 247 P.3d at 623. 
45 Id., 150 Idaho at 397, 247 P.3d at 624. 
46 Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Mass. 2002), quoted with approval in Terra-West, 150 
Idaho 393, 247 P.3d at 624. 
47 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 397, 247 P.3d at 624. 
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practicality” and “would create needless confusion and duplication.”48  Under this approach, “a 
plaintiff would inevitably be forced to incur additional litigation costs associated with filing a 
separate action[,] and scarce judicial resources would be wasted by adding unnecessary cases to 
the court’s calendar.”49   
Noting that “[t]his Court has previously recognized that federal case law provides 
persuasive authority when interpreting rules under the I.R.C.P. that are substantially similar to 
rules under the F.R.C.P.,”50 this Court then reviewed applicable federal case law addressing the 
interplay between Rule 3 governing commencement of actions and the effect of filing a motion 
for leave to amend a complaint.  The Court analyzed four federal cases, all of which concluded 
that the filing of a motion for leave to amend commenced an action under Rule 3.51 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 625. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. (citing Mayes v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 867 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989) (because filing an 
amended complaint requires leave of court, “the amended complaint [was] deemed filed within 
the limitations period” where the motion to amend was filed before the limitations period 
expired); Moore v. State, 999 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (“As a party has no control over when a 
court renders its decision regarding the proposed amended complaint, the submission of a motion 
for leave to amend, properly accompanied by the proposed amended complaint that provides 
notice of the substance of those amendments, tolls the statute of limitations, even though 
technically the amended complaint will not be filed until the court rules on the motion”); 
Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Export Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1927) (a motion to amend “stands in 
the place of an actual amendment”); Longo v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 618 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Pa. 
1985) (“The timely filing of [the] Motion to Amend and not the final court approval was 
sufficient to meet the requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 3 that ‘a civil action is commenced by the 
filing of a complaint with the court’”). 
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Having answered the question of the effect of filing a motion to amend that did not 
involve addition of a new party, the Court briefly discussed cases wherein a motion to amend 
seeks to add a new party, as was the case in Griggs v. Nash,52 a 1989 Idaho Supreme Court 
decision.  The Griggs court did not address federal and other state jurisprudence concerning 
commencement of actions in the context of a motion for leave to amend.  Instead, the Court in 
Griggs determined that because Rule 3 provides that an action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint, the third-party action had commenced when the complaint was formally filed.53  The 
distinction, said the Court in Terra-West, was that the third-party in Griggs, not yet being a party 
to the suit, had no notice of the “substance of the proposed amendment,”54 while the party 
against whom the amended complaint was filed in Terra-West was already a party to the case 
and therefore knew the substance of the proposed amendment.55  Presumably, then, if a non-
party knew the “substance of the proposed amendment” before the motion to amend was filed, 
the amended complaint could relate back to the date of the motion, the same as if the amendment 
added a new claim for relief against an existing party.    
In the present case, whether the Englishes’ filing of the motion to amend commenced the 
action—that is, whether the “settled rule” adopted in Terra-West applied—turns on what the 
Terra-West Court meant by “notice of the substance of the proposed amendment.”   
52 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989). 
53 Id. at 126. 
54 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 400, 247 P3d. at 627. 
55 Id. at 626-27. 
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The trial court concluded that “the substance of the proposed amendment was either a 
copy of the proposed amendment or sufficiently descriptive text included in the amendment 
itself.”56  The trial court then reasoned that because the Englishes did not serve the Medical 
Defendants with a copy of the Englishes’ motion to amend before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, the “settled rule” of Terra-West did not apply.57  Said differently, according to the 
trial court’s interpretation of Terra-West, the filing of the motion to amend would never itself 
have commenced the Englishes’ claims against the Medical Defendants, but had the Englishes 
effectuated service of the motion to amend on the Medical Defendants prior to the expiration of 
the limitations period, the date of service would have been the effective date the claims 
commenced, because that would have been the date the Medical Defendants had actual notice of 
the action that would be filed against them. 
The Englishes disagree with this interpretation and urge this Court to evaluate the 
language it used instead of the language the trial court wishes it had used.  Terra-West does not 
require service of a motion to amend on a non-party; it requires “notice of the substance of the 
proposed amendment,” which could be given in any number of ways other than serving a copy of 
the motion to amend.  The Englishes urge this Court to reject the trial court’s reasoning and 
reverse its decision for three reasons.   
56 R Vol. 2, p. 218 (Opinion and order granting Medical Defendants’ Motions for Summary 
Judgment, citing Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 399, 247 P.3d at 626). 
57 Id. at R Vol. 2, pp. 218-19. 
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First, the trial court’s conclusion is simply not supported by the plain language of Terra-
West.  This Court knows how to establish a rule of law.  Had it intended to require a plaintiff to 
effectuate service of a motion for leave to amend as the sole means of providing “notice of the 
substance of the proposed amendment,” it would have said as much.  This Court did not dictate 
any one true way of providing notice of the substance of the proposed amendment; it simply 
required that notice be provided. 
Second, the trial court’s reasoning is not supported by the authorities this Court cited with 
approval in Terra-West,58 which included Mayes v. AT&T Info Sys., Inc.,59 Moore v. State,60 
Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Export Co.,61 and Longo v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co.62  None of these 
cases held that serving a motion for leave to amend was the only way to provide notice of the 
substance of a proposed amendment.  Mayes concerned a motion to amend the complaint to add 
a new party to the action, but in holding that the filing of the motion for leave to amend 
commenced the action,63 the Eighth Circuit said nothing at all about notice to the new defendant.  
Moore involved a motion to amend that was defective not because it was not served on the 
proposed new defendants, but because it was not accompanied by a proposed amended complaint 
58 See Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 398, 247 P.3d at 625. 
59 867 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989). 
60 999 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1993). 
61 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1927). 
62 618 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Pa. 1985). 
63 Mayes, 867 F.2d at 1173. 
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setting forth the specifics of the claims.  Because Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires a statement of grounds supporting the motion, the court reasoned that because 
the motion was not accompanied by an amended complaint and did not explain the claims 
therein, the motion failed under Rule 7(b).64  In both Rademaker and Longo, the new defendant 
incidentally had prior notice of the substance of the claims against him, but neither case held that 
such notice was a requirement in order to deem the complaint filed as of the date the motion to 
amend was filed.  Rather, the Rademaker court held that “an application for leave to amend . . . 
stands in the place of an actual amendment,”65 and the Longo court held that the timely filing of 
the motion to amend to add a new party was “sufficient to meet the requirement of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 3 that ‘a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court.’”66   
Longo is particularly instructive because the new defendant who had notice of the 
substance of the claims within the limitations period did not have notice because of being served 
with a motion to amend, but because he had previously spoken with the plaintiff by phone after 
the motor vehicle accident at issue, and because the complaint had mistakenly named the wrong 
party, which was a business owned by his mother that shared the same office as the new 
defendant.67  If this Court in Terra-West meant to require plaintiffs to effectuate service of 
motions to amend on proposed new parties in order to commence claims against those new 
64 Moore, 999 F.2d at 1131. 
65 Rademaker, 17 F.2d at 17. 
66 Longo, 618 F.Supp. at 89. 
67 Id. at 90. 
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parties, it would not have relied on four federal cases that did not support that proposition, 
particularly where those cases involved notice provided in a variety of ways, including a phone 
call. 
The third and most critical reason Plaintiff urges this Court to reject the trial court’s 
interpretation of this Court’s language is that the trial court’s reading deprives the Terra-West 
language of its clear meaning to the detriment of the Englishes under the facts of this case.  The 
Medical Defendants had more abundant “notice of the substance of the proposed amendment” 
than any civil defendant would ever have because of not only discussions with the Englishes’ 
counsel prior to filing suit, but more especially because of statutory prelitigation requirements 
applicable in medical negligence cases.   
Because the Englishes’ claims against the Medical Defendants were medical negligence 
claims, the Englishes had a statutory obligation to file with the Idaho Board of Medicine and 
serve upon the Medical Defendants a written statement of their claims against the Medical 
Defendants, setting forth “when, where and under what circumstances the health care in question 
allegedly was improperly provided or withheld and the general and special damages attributed 
thereto.”68  Pursuant to statute, the Board of Medicine then appointed a panel, which held a 
hearing on the Englishes’ claims, during which the Medical Defendants had an opportunity to 
respond to those claims.69  On November 18, 2013, the panel filed a written opinion regarding 
the Englishes’ claims with the Board of Medicine, which was served upon the Medical 
68 IDAHO CODE § 6-1007. 
69 Id. at §§ 6-1001, 6-1002. 
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Defendants.70  Thus, before the Englishes even filed their motion for leave to amend, and well 
within the limitations period, the Medical Defendants not only knew “that [they] may be subject 
to an impending action,”71 but were thoroughly and indisputably aware of the substance of the 
claims against them—the very claims of which they received written notice and responded to 
through the statutory prelitigation procedure. 
The trial court did not consider these facts or whether the Medical Defendants had actual 
notice of the substance of the claims because it rejected that language in favor of a strict 
procedural requirement not found in Terra-West.  If Idaho law requires “notice of the substance 
of a proposed amendment” within the limitations period as a precondition to application of 
Terra-West’s “settled rule” commencing actions upon the filing of a motion to amend, the 
Medical Defendants had that notice in abundance.  Indeed, if a phone call and general familiarity 
with an action such as the “notice” in Longo that this Court cited with approval constitutes 
sufficient notice of the substance of the amendment, certainly a statutory prelitigation process 
requiring notice, a hearing, and a written opinion on the substance of the very claims asserted in 
the amendment satisfies the notice requirement.   The Englishes were entitled to and did rely on 
this Court’s language and the authorities it cited in Terra-West, and they simply ask this Court to 
apply that language here. 
70 See R Vol. 1, p. 47 (Affidavit of Marvin M. Smith, ¶ 3). 
71 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 399-400, 247 P.3d at 626-27.  Importantly, neither Terra-West nor 
any other Idaho authorities require notice that a complaint has been filed, but only that one may 
be filed.  Both the Medical Defendants and the trial court below focused on notice that a claim 
will be or has been filed, but that is not the question. 
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In fact, the Medical Defendants had more notice than they would have had if the 
Englishes had simply served them with a copy of their proposed amended complaint.  A 
complaint consists of allegations of wrongdoing, but in the prelitigation proceeding the claimant 
cannot rely on allegations alone but must present evidence to support his allegations.72 And 
because the prelitigation screening process is a prerequisite to filing suit, the Medical Defendants 
knew or should have known that a complaint against them would be forthcoming.  Thus, in a 
medical malpractice case such as this, the prelitigation screening process provides the functional 
equivalent of service of a proposed amended complaint, which the trial court recognized would 
have been sufficient to start the Englishes’ action against the Medical Defendants.   
The trial court’s interpretation of Terra-West is not supported by the authorities this 
Court referenced and renders nugatory this Court’s language requiring “notice of the substance 
of the proposed amendment” by substituting that plain language with a procedural requirement 
that a motion be filed and served on non-parties. The Englishes’ course of action was a 
permissible option, yet application of the trial court’s rule of law would make this permissible 
course of action impossible as a matter of law.  This is not the law of Idaho, and the Englishes 
urge the Court to reject that narrow and unsupported interpretation and, at the very least, reiterate 
the notice requirement already set forth in Terra-West. 
5. Applying a notice requirement to claims against proposed new parties is 
unnecessary and procedurally inconsistent. 
 
72 E.g., James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 709, 727 P.2d 1136, 1137 (1986) (“The purpose of the 
[prelitigation screening] panel is to receive evidence concerning the plaintiff’s claim”).  
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The Englishes believe that they complied with the notice requirements of Idaho law 
under Terra-West, and therefore that they should prevail in this appeal for that reason.  However, 
if this Court disagrees, the Englishes request that the Court examine the necessity and 
practicality of the notice requirement applied to motions to amend seeking to add new parties. 
The trial court acknowledged that the issue of commencement of actions against new defendants 
“was not before the court in Terra-West,”73 which concerned a motion to amend that did not 
involve adding new parties.  The issue now being squarely before this Court, the Englishes 
propose that a notice requirement is not necessary and results in procedural inconsistencies, and 
they ask the Court to allow the “settled rule” to apply to all new claims brought by way of a 
motion to amend, including claims against new defendants.   
This Court’s concern in Terra-West was that a motion for leave to amend to add a new 
party 
does not give any notice to the third party that it may be subject to an impending 
action.  Because the third party would not be served with the motion for leave to a 
file a third-party complaint, the third party may discover, after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations, that a previously filed motion to which the third party 
had no notice, commenced the proceedings.  Such a rule is contrary to the 
purposes of any statute of limitations, which function to prevent stale claims and 
to protect a defendant’s reasonable expectation that his earlier conduct can no 
longer give rise to liability.74 
 
73 R Vol. 2, p. 219. 
74 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 400, 247 P.3d at 627. 
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The trial court posited that “[w]hile the Supreme Court did not specify the reasoning for this 
requirement, justice suggests to enjoy this benefit, the plaintiff must take steps to mitigate 
damage potentially suffered by the potential defendant.”75   
There are three difficulties with this reasoning that the Terra-West Court was not asked to 
consider, and which the trial court below chose not to consider.  First, requiring notice to a 
proposed new defendant within the limitations period that it may be subject to an action places 
new defendants on different footing than other defendants.  A plaintiff may file an original 
complaint on the last day of the limitations period, and that complaint is deemed timely, whether 
the named defendants have notice of the substance of the claims or not.  Indeed, pursuant to Rule 
4, which requires service of the summons and complaint within six months after filing the 
complaint, the defendant may not have any knowledge of the substance or even existence of the 
action for fully six months after the complaint is filed.  It is not at all clear why adopting the 
“settled rule” deeming an action commenced upon the filing of a motion to amend is “contrary to 
the purposes of any statute of limitations” but deeming an original complaint timely without any 
notice to the defendant until many months after filing is not.  Contrary to the trial court’s 
opinion, there is no “damage potentially suffered by the potential defendant”76 named by way of 
a motion to amend, any more than there is damage to a defendant named in an original 
75 R Vol. 2, p. 219. 
76 Id. 
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complaint—both are timely named in a lawsuit.  The law should operate uniformly.77  Applying 
a notice requirement to one type of defendant where there has never been a notice requirement 
for others does not remedy problems, but instead creates them by unnecessarily placing claims 
and defendants on unequal grounds. 
Second, the policy considerations underlying the “settled rule” apply no less in the 
context of an amendment adding new parties than they do with any other amendment.  In the 
context of any amended complaint, “the plaintiff only has unilateral control over the timing of 
the filing of the motion for leave to amend, but does not have unilateral control over when the 
motion may be granted.”78  This is why, in both contexts,  
the filing of the motion is comparable to the original filing of the complaint, both 
in the sense that each is the first step that a plaintiff takes and the first document 
that a plaintiff files with the court concerning the action, and in the sense that both 
the filing of the original complaint and the filing of the motion to amend are steps 
that remain unilaterally in the plaintiff’s control.79   
 
The trial court suggested that this procedural problem is best remedied by requiring that a 
plaintiff file a separate action, and then move to consolidate the actions.80  Yet not only would 
77 E.g., Cowles Pub. Co. v. Magistrate Court of the 1st Jud. Dist., 118 Idaho 753, 757, 800 P.2d 
640, 644 (1990) (“we desire a uniform application of law throughout the state”); Big Wood 
Canal Co. v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 388, 263 P. 45, 53 (1927) (“The constitutional 
requirement of uniformity in the case of a general law is complied with if it operates alike upon 
all persons or property under the same circumstances and conditions.”).   
78 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 397, 247 P.3d at 624. 
79 Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Mass. 2002), quoted with approval in Terra-West, 150 
Idaho at 397, 247 P.3d at 624. 
80 R Vol. 2, pp. 219-220 (“While not directly holding such, the . . .  Court also suggested that 
filing a separate action and attempting to consolidate might be a better course of action when 
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the very problems this Court identified in Terra-West still arise (compromising “the principles of 
judicial economy and practicality,” creating “needless confusion and duplication,”81 forcing 
plaintiffs “to incur additional litigation costs associated with filing a separate action[, and 
wasting] scarce judicial resources . . . by adding an unnecessary case to the court’s calendar”)82, 
other procedural problems would also abound.   
The present case illustrates this point.  The action against the Cook Defendants had been 
removed to federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction.  The federal court would have lacked 
jurisdiction over an action against the Medical Defendants (as there was not diversity of parties 
between the plaintiffs and the Medical Defendants), and so a separate action against them would 
have had to have been filed in state court.  There is, however, no procedural mechanism to join a 
state action with a federal action.  Were the trial court’s proposed solution to have been 
employed, the net result would have been not only all the ills identified in Terra-West, but also 
two parallel but un-joinable actions proceeding forward on separate, parallel tracks, contrary to 
Idaho’s comparative negligence principles, and risking inconsistent verdicts.83  The trial court 
dealing with third-party complaints”).  Of course, if a plaintiff elected this course of action, the 
new defendant might not have notice of the claim against it for up to six months, yet the claim 
would be considered timely filed. 
81 Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 397, 247 P.3d at 624. 
82 Id., 150 Idaho at 398, 247 P.3d at 625. 
83 See IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801, 6-802 (embracing comparative negligence and directing courts to 
allow juries to allocate negligence or responsibility attributable to each party); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 
19(a)(1) (requiring joinder of parties where one party’s absence would compromise complete 
relief or leave others subject to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations). 
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determined that its conclusion was “not unjust because Plaintiffs had the ability to file a new 
action against the Medical Defendants that would have guaranteed preservation of Plaintiffs’ 
claim.”84  The Englishes’ claim against the Medical Defendant may have been preserved, but it 
would be unjust to make them try their claims against the Medical Defendants and the Cook 
Defendants separately when they both arose from the same transaction or occurrence.  Without 
both sets of defendants in the same case, the jury in each case could decide that the non-party 
defendant was at fault, and the Englishes could be left without a remedy for a clear wrong caused 
by one or the other.  This is precisely the impractical and unjust situation Idaho’s joinder rules 
were intended to prevent.   
Third, the concerns giving rise to the Terra-West notice requirement are simply not 
shared by other federal or state jurisdictions, which, with two exceptions, do not require notice at 
all.  Idaho’s Rule 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, 
petition or application with the court.”85  This tracks the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure86 and 
the vast majority of state claim commencement rules.87  In nearly all of these jurisdictions, the 
case law addressing the effect of filing a motion to amend to add a new party provides that the 
84 R Vol. 2, p. 219. 
85 IDAHO R. CIV. P. 3(a)(1). 
86 See FED. R. CIV. P. 3. (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court”). 
87 The following jurisdictions use either identical or substantially similar language in their rules 
or statutes governing commencement of claims:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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filing of the motion to amend commences the claims.88 This includes the cases this Court cited 
with approval in Terra-West.89 
88 See Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 958 F. Supp. 869, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“The filing of a motion to amend constitutes commencement of an action. When a 
plaintiff seeks to add a new defendant in an existing action, the date of the filing of the motion to 
amend constitutes the date the action was commenced for statute of limitations purposes.”) 
(quoting Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Alberts, 769 F. Supp. 498, 510 (S.D.N.Y.1991), which 
cited Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 36 F.R.D. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y.1964)); In re Integrated Res. 
Real Estate Ltd. P’ship Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Where a plaintiff 
seeks to add a new defendant in an existing action, the date of the filing of the motion to amend 
constitutes the date the action was commenced for statute of limitations purposes”) (quoting 
Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Inc. v. Alberts, 769 F. Supp. 498, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), which cited 
Schiavone v. Fortune aka Time, Inc., 477 U.S. 21, 25–32 (1986)); Williams v. Totura & Co., Inc., 
718 So.2d 375, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“An amended complaint relates back to the date a 
motion to amend is filed; the timely filing of such motion defeats a statute of limitations 
defense”); Simpson v. Hatteras Island Gallery Restaurant, Inc., 427 S.E.2d 131, 138 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993) (“The relevant date for measuring the statute of limitations where an amendment to a 
pleading is concerned, however, is the date of the filing of the motion, not the date the court rules 
on that motion.  ‘The timely filing of the motion to amend, if later allowed, is sufficient to start 
the action within the period of limitations.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mauney v. Morris, 
340 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. 1986)). Some jurisdictions require that a copy of the proposed 
amended complaint accompany the motion to amend.  See, e.g., Flood v. Hardy, 868 F. Supp. 
809, 814 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff’s amended complaint related back to the 
date the motion to amend was filed where the motion was accompanied by the amended 
complaint); Sheets v. Dziabis, 738 F. Supp. 307, 313 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (“the filing of a motion for 
leave to amend a complaint to add a defendant, accompanied by the proposed amended 
complaint, tolls the statute of limitations from the date the motion is filed even if the motion is 
not granted until after the limitations period expired”) (citing Eaton Corp. v. Alliance Valves Co., 
634 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Smith v. Metropolitan 
Dade County, 338 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“The better rule is that a motion for 
leave to amend with the amended complaint attached joining additional defendants filed within 
the statutory period stands in the place of the actual amendment which is filed with leave of court 
subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations”) (citing Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Export 
Co., 17 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1927)).  Courts have come to the same conclusion in cases 
involving motions to intervene, see Korwek v. Hunt, 649 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(“the date of filing of a successful intervention motion is taken to be the date the action is 
brought, for limitations purposes, in situations in which the formal complaint is not filed until 
after intervention is granted”), and motions relating to the expiration of the statute of repose, see 
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The few jurisdictions that have considered but not adopted the “settled rule” deeming an 
action commenced when a motion for leave to amend is filed fall into two camps.  Those in the 
first camp have rejected the “settled rule” for jurisdiction-specific reasons.  Pennsylvania, for 
example, requires that specific actions be taken to commence an action, including filing a 
complaint or a preaecipe for a writ of summons in the prothonotary’s office.90  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, in declining to adopt the rule deeming an action against a new defendant 
commenced upon filing a motion for leave to amend, expressly distinguished Pennsylvania’s 
action commencement procedures from other jurisdictions, like federal courts and Idaho, that 
require that an action be filed “with the court.”91  Because Pennsylvania’s action commencement 
Nett ex rel. Nett v. Bellucci, 306 F.3d 1153 (1st Cir. 2002) (the filing of a motion to amend to add 
a party, not the date on which the amended complaint is filed after leave of court is granted, is 
the operative date for the commencement of an action for purposes of Massachusetts’s statute of 
repose). 
89 See discussion of Moore, Mayes, Rademaker, and Longo on pages 18-19, supra.  None of 
these cases required notice to the proposed new defendant as a condition for deeming the claims 
against the new defendant commenced as of the filing of the motion to amend. 
90 PA. R. CIV. P. 1007.  There are several jurisdictions that have specific requirements beyond 
simply filing a complaint with the court in order to deem an action commenced.  For example, 
North Dakota’s Rule 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the service of a 
summons.”  Minnesota’s Rule 3.01(a) provides that a civil action is commenced against each 
defendant “when the summons is served upon that defendant.”   
91 See Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992):  
We recognize that the federal courts have allowed a petition to amend, with copy 
of the amended complaint attached, to have the effect of tolling an applicable 
statute of limitations.  They have done so by relying upon the federal rule which 
provides that ‘[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.’ 
In Pennsylvania, however, a civil action can only be commenced in the manner 
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rules did not use that language and imposed other requirements, the court determined that 
adoption of the “settled rule” would be inappropriate. 
The other camp consists of jurisdictions that have rejected the “settled rule” by conflating 
the “settled rule” analysis with a Rule 15 relation back analysis, which addresses a completely 
different issue.  The Mississippi Supreme Court is one example.  In Curry v. Turner,92 a 2002 
Mississippi Supreme Court decision, the plaintiff had moved the court within the limitations 
period to amend the complaint to add new parties, but the court granted the motion to amend 
after the limitations period had expired.93  The plaintiff petitioned the court to adopt the “settled 
rule” and even cited some of the same authorities that the Idaho Supreme Court embraced in 
Terra-West.94  The Mississippi court acknowledged that federal courts and many state 
jurisdictions apply the “settled rule” allowing motions to amend to commence actions against 
new defendants,95 but then, rather than analyzing the propriety or applicability of the rule, it 
instead viewed the “settled rule” as an alternative to Rule 15(c) relation back of amendments, 
and concluded that because Rule 15(c) had already been adopted in Mississippi, it must apply to 
provided by R.C.P. 1007.  Here, nothing was filed in the Prothonotary’s Office 
until after the statute of limitations had run.  
(Citations omitted.) 
92 832 So.2d 508 (Miss. 2002). 
93 Id. at 510. 
94 See id. at 511-12 (citing Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Exp. Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1927), and 
Mayes v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 867 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
95 Curry, 832 So.2d at 511-12. 
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this question.  The court then concluded that because the proposed new defendants had no notice 
of the institution of the action against them, as Rule 15(c) requires, the claims did not relate back 
to the original filing.96 
The trouble with this reasoning is that it uses Rule 15(c) to analyze a problem Rule 15(c) 
was not intended to address.  Rule 15(c) allows amended claims filed after the statute of 
limitations to relate back to the filing of the original complaint when (1) the claim arose out of 
the same set of facts as those set forth in the original pleading, and, (2) if seeking to add a new 
party, the new party received notice of the institution of the action and knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have 
been brought against them.97  “The principal purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to 
correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice 
his adversary in any way.”98  If, therefore, a plaintiff does not seek to correct an error after the 
statute of limitations has run, Rule 15(c) is inapposite.   
Here, the trial court appeared to understand this distinction and did not inject a Rule 15(c) 
analysis into its decision.  That is because in seeking to add the Medical Defendants, the 
Englishes did not seek to correct an error, and the Englishes’ relevant actions did not occur after 
the statute of limitations had run, but before.  The problem here is not a mistake, but a procedural 
conundrum presented by reason of the fact that the Englishes did not control when the federal 
96 Id. at 513-14. 
97 IDAHO R. CIV. P. 15(c).  See also MISS. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (same); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (same). 
98 Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 38 (1986). 
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court would grant their motion to amend.  All of the jurisdictions in which the “settled rule” has 
been adopted have a corollary of Rule 15(c), yet they have recognized that Rule 15(c) does not 
address the problem, which is why they have adopted the “settled rule” to address the problem 
presented here.  Rule 15(c) simply has nothing to do with the problem identified in this appeal. 
Idaho has long embraced the policy that controversies should be decided on their merits 
whenever possible:   
The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote 
the administration of justice.  Those statutes and rules which fix the time within 
which procedural rights are to be asserted are intended to expedite the disposition 
of causes to the end that justice will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary 
delay.  But, except as to those which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural 
regulations should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the 
disposition of causes upon their substantial merits without delay or prejudice.99 
 
The Englishes propose that the better rule of law, which maintains consistency with Idaho’s Rule 
3 and with the sound policy considerations recognized in state and federal courts across the 
country for decades, is to deem new claims commenced upon the filing of a motion for leave to 
amend, including claims against proposed new defendants.  Requiring notice to proposed new 
parties creates non-uniform application of law to defendants, creates procedural problems for 
plaintiffs, and is simply unnecessary given Rule 4’s service requirements for actions timely 
commenced.   
 
 
  
99 Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121, 247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Englishes filed a motion in federal court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to 
add the Medical Defendants as defendants. Federal law deems the filing of a motion to amend a 
complaint to be the date on which an action against additional proposed defendants commences, 
and the federal court therefore deemed the amended complaint filed within the statute of 
limitations. That should be dispositive of this appeal. 
But if the Court determines that Idaho law applies, current Idaho law requires that a 
proposed new defendant be given notice of the substance of the claims against it within the 
limitations period, and the Medical Defendants had such notice in abundance. The Englishes 
complied with this requirement, but also propose that the Court embrace the policy 
considerations it recognized in Terra-West and their application to all motions to amend, 
including motions seeking to add new parties, and hold that an amended complaint is deemed 
filed as of the date of the motion to amend. 
Dated this 5'~ y of November, 2015 . 
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